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Kevin Rechkoff  
 
 In their decision to partially vacate and partially reverse the 
district court’s holding for the Defendants, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed 
the authority of federal agencies to determine the criteria for grazing on 
federal land. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s 
attempt to attach long established water rights to grazing rights through 
necessity. Thus, parties seeking to access federal lands for grazing must 
seek and acquire a permit through the BLM, removing the possibility of 
water rights representing a sufficient interest to lay claim to a property 
right. Lastly, any of Defendant’s assertions that federal agencies and 
officials had violated the APA were moot due to the running of the 




 In United States v. Estate of Hage, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed federal regulations and statutes 
governing the approval process of grazing permits.1 Finding binding and 
explicit language in multiple statutes—stating possession and 
maintenance of a grazing permit was required to access federal lands—
the Ninth Circuit determined the Hages had failed to meet those 
mandates by not obtaining a permit.2 Finding that the Secretary of the 
Interior possesses statutory authority to approve or reject grazing 
permits, the Ninth Circuit held that in the absence of federal agency 
approval, grazers do not have a right to access federal lands.3 Therefore, 
the Hages were forced to seek alternate legal theories in their attempt to 
assert a right to access federal lands.4 In its review, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the Hages property right theory.5 Finding no maneuver could 
legally circumnavigate the federal government’s authority to issue 
grazing permits, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the United States.6  
                                                 
1.  United States v. Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 717-18 (9th Cir. 2016). 
2.  Id.  
3.  Id.  
4.  Id. at 719, 720.  
5.  Id. at 722. 
6.  Id. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
E. Wayne Hage and his son, Wayne Hage, began a grazing 
operation on federal land in 1978.7 The Hages filed for and received 
grazing permits through the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and 
the United States Forest Service.8 In 1993, however, the Hages failed to 
receive approval in their attempts to renew their grazing permits. 9 
Despite the rejection of their application, the Hages “continued to graze 
cattle on federal lands.”10 
 In response, the United States filed trespass claims against the 
Hages under Nevada state law, seeking injunctive relief and damages.11 
In support, the United States cited multiple statutes that explicitly 
required a permit to graze on federal land.12 Under the Taylor Grazing 
Act of 1934 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”), ranchers maintaining grazing operations on federal land are 
expressly required to receive a permit from the federal government.13 In 
response, the Hages asserted that a permit was not required because the 
family had acquired a property interest in the land, making the trespass 
claim moot. 14  Specifically, the Hages pointed to an appurtenant—
adjacent to—water right for their cattle to consume river water.15  
 Although the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada determined the Hages had grazed on federal lands without the 
proper documentation, United States District Judge Robert C. Jones held 
in favor of the Hages.16 Judge Jones accepted the Hages contention that 
the appurtenant water right created an “easement by necessity” for the 
cattle to cross federal land.17 Without the easement, the Hages argued, 
the water right would be useless. 18  Agreeing with the Hages, and 
ignoring binding case and statutory law, the district court ruled that an 
easement, and thus a property right, had been created, granting the Hages 
                                                 
7.  Id. at 715.  
8.  Id.  
9.  Id.  
10.  Id.  
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. at 717.  
13.  Id.  
14.  Id. at 718.  
15.  Id.  
16.  Id. at 715.  
17.  Id.   
18. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 171 (Fed. Cl. 1996).  
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the legal right to cross and graze on the federal land in question.19 The 
district court stated the cattle were also permitted to wander a 
“reasonable distance” from the water to graze because to require the 
Hages to keep their cattle from moving onto federal land would be 
“infeasible.”20 “‘Arbitrar[ily],’” the district court subsequently concluded 
that a distance of “one-half mile” from the water source would be a 
reasonable distance for the cattle to travel without trespassing onto 
federal lands.21 Thus, because all but two of the trespass claims involved 
cattle grazing within the newly constructed half-mile boundary, the 
federal government was only awarded damages of 165.88 dollars.22  
 Furthermore, Judge Jones encouraged the Hages to file a counter 
claim, stating the their constitutional right of due process had been 
violated by the federal government’s issuance of trespass notices without 
court permission.23  Citing this lack of notice as his reasoning, Judge 
Jones issued an injunction against the government, preventing federal 
agencies from issuing trespass notifications without court “permission.”24 
Lastly, Judge Jones held two BLM officials involved in the Hages claims 
in contempt of court.25 The United States filed a timely appeal.26  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
  
On appeal, the United States asserted the language from statutes 
governing grazing practices and management on federal lands explicitly 
required permits to be issued before the implementation of a grazing 
operation. 27  Specifically, the United States argued that the Taylor 
Grazing Act and FLPMA state that an issuance of a permit does not grant 
the grazer any title to the land.28 Relying on long established case law, 
the United States further asserted that a permit, and the right to use the 
                                                 
19.  Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 715.   
20.  Id. at 716.  
21.  Id. (quoting United States v. Estate of Hage, No. 2:07-cv-
01154_RCJ, 2013 WL 2295696, *45 (D. Nev. May 24, 2013)). 
22.  Id.  
23.  Id. at 715. 
24.  Id. at 716. 
25.  Id. at 715. 
26.  Id. at 716.  
27.  Id. at 717. 
28.  Id.  
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land is a “‘revocable privilege.’”29 Thus, because the Hages had failed to 
obtain the proper permits, the Hages were trespassing on federal property 
without the requisite authority. 30  Countering, the Hages relied on the 
district court’s ruling that an appurtenant water right gave the family a 
property interest through an easement to graze federal lands absent a 
permit.31  
 In response to the district court’s obscure ruling, the federal 
government conceded that while grazers who own water rights receive 
preferential treatment in the application process, a water right in isolation 
does not confer a property right to graze on adjacent land. 32  The 
requirement to give water rights holder’s preferential treatment comes 
from federal statutory law.33 However, the federal government asserted 
there was no mention of a property right being conferred when a water 
right exists in a grazing situation.34 Thus, the government argued that the 
district court’s “theory” granting the Hages’ an “easement of necessity” 
had no merit.35 The United States contented, and the Ninth Circuit found 
that federal statutory law expressly states the opposite, and represents the 
preeminent authority.36  
 Additionally, the United States demonstrated that authority to 
access federal land without a permit only extends to crossings to 
construct diversions to perfect the water right.37 In summation, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that attempts to seek other types of easements have been 
“expressly rejected,” and possession of water rights is “irrelevant” to the 
question of grazing access.38 The only valid entry of federal lands in 
relation to water rights is for “diversionary” purposes. 39  Because the 
Hages did not seek to divert water, the court ruled that the creation of an 
“easement by necessity” was a misleading and erroneous application of 
existing statutory and case law.40  
                                                 
29.  Id. (quoting Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 1983)).  
30.  Id. at 718 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1733(g) (2012)).  
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. at 717 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012)).  
33.  Id.  
34.  Id. (citing Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967)).  
35.  Id. at 718. 
36.  Id. at 717. 
37.  Id. (citing Hunter, 388 F.2d 148).  
38.  Id. at 718. 
39.  Id. at 719.  
40.  Id. at 722.  
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 The court also held the “easement by necessity” theory 
confounded foundational principles of property law.41 In order to create 
an easement in the fashion the Hages contend, a “severance of title” is 
required.42 However, here, no severance of title occurred.43 By issuing 
“reasonable regulations” requiring a grazing permits, the federal 
government had properly evoked conditions for acquiring access to the 
lands.44 The court concluded that because the Hages had not obtained a 
permit they had no grounds on which an easement could be established.45  
 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the federal government’s 
application of governing statutory law.46  Singling out Judge Jones as 
having an improper bias against federal agencies, the court admonished 
his ruling as having no support in either case or statutory law. 47  In 
particular, the court pointed to the record as evidence of Judge Jones’s 
improper bias against the federal government, and in particular the BLM 
and the Forest Service.48  
 In addition to Judge Jones’s personal contempt for federal 
agencies, the Ninth Circuit also concluded his reliance on case law was 
clearly erroneous. 49  The only case cited by the Hages at trial, and 
emphasized by Judge Jones as authority, was also misplaced.50 In the 
Hages’ effort to assert an Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) 
violation, they were required to overcome expiration of the APA’s six-
year statute of limitations.51 Because the Hages grazing application was 
rejected eighteen years before the commencement of these proceedings, 
the Hages’ attempted to demonstrate that final agency action was not 
taken until the government sued them for trespass. 52  In support, the 
Hages cited an excerpt of a case that stated litigation could be construed 
as the final agency action, tolling the statute of limitations.53 However, 
                                                 
41.  Id. at 719. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id.  
44.  Id.  
45.  Id.  
46.  Id.   
47.  Id. at 722. 
48.  Id.  
49.  Id. at 721.  
50.  Id. (citing AT&T Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 270 
F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).  
51.  Id.  
52.  Id.  
53.  Id. (citing AT&T, 270 F.3d at 975).  
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the Ninth Circuit rejected that contention, stating the excerpt from the 
case was misleading, and that the court in that situation had ruled out 
litigation procedures as a mechanism for tolling statutes of limitations.54 
Thus, the Hages were left without support for their claim of an APA 
violation.  
 Upon it’s conclusions regarding the district court’s improper 
application of the governing statutes and the APA, the Ninth Circuit 
ordered the case to be handled by a different judge on remand.55 In it’s 
reasoning for invoking a rarely used procedural tool, the Ninth Circuit 
pointed to Judge Jones’s heavy bias and egregious application of the 
governing statutes. 56  Particularly, the court perceived Judge Jones’s 
encouragement of the Hages’ APA claim as an improper conduct for a 
judge overseeing the same case.57 In a perceived abuse of judicial power, 
the Ninth Circuit ordered Judge Jones to remove himself as the 
individual proceeding in the determinations of damages stemming from 
the Hages’ unauthorized crossing onto federal lands.58  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
  By firmly rejecting the district court’s application of statutory 
and binding case law, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the necessity of 
maintaining a valid permit while grazing on federal lands. Through a 
multitude of authorities, the court removed any doubt as to the 
mandatory nature of permits for grazers. Additionally, by ruling against 
the Hages and assessing trespatory damages against them, the court 
confirmed private citizens have the burden of ensuring grazing permits 
are maintained and strictly followed. Lastly, the Ninth’s Circuit’s stern 
admonishing of a district judge demonstrates the repercussions of 
conduct considered outside the purview and authority of judges.  
                                                 
54.  Id.  
55.  Id. at 724.  
56.  Id. at 722. 
57.  Id.  
58.  Id. at 723.  
